讀後心得

A Chinese national spouse, 亚亚, posted on TikTok promoting unification thoughts, which the Taiwanese Ministry of the Interior identified as a national security threat and set a deadline for her to leave the country. This incident sparked discussions about freedom of speech and the defense of democracy, revealing Taiwan's vulnerability to Chinese cultural infiltration on social media. Critics pointed out that academia has not provided specific recommendations on how to define the boundaries of freedom of speech and respond to China's United Front strategies. 亚亚's short video is not an isolated incident but rather part of China's cultural infiltration using digital platforms, gradually manipulating identity and fear through entertainment content. Experts suggest that Taiwan's political economy of communication must adapt to the new media ecosystem, challenge the information monopoly caused by algorithms, and propose effective response strategies to protect democracy and cultural sovereignty.

Recently, a Chinese spouse named "亞亞" was reported for posting multiple short videos promoting unification on the TikTok platform. After being reported, the Ministry of the Interior deemed her actions a threat to national security, subsequently revoking her residence permit and mandating her departure. This incident has sparked discussions regarding the boundaries of free speech and democratic defense, as well as some self-reflection among certain "pro-China leftist" individuals. Additionally, the controversy reveals the forefront of narrative infiltration and cognitive warfare within China's short video context. How Taiwan's critical communication political economy adjusts its narrative direction to address the challenges of global anti-community hegemony, algorithmic control, and short video cognitive warfare has become a pressing issue.

Taking the statement from Professor 馮建三 and 75 scholars as an example, they criticized the Lai Ching-te administration for compressing free speech but did not propose specific policy recommendations that delineate the boundaries of defensive democracy and free speech. They also failed to comment on the United Front model employed by the Chinese spouse 亞亞 and the cognitive warfare structure behind it. What surprises us is that scholars like 馮建三 and 郭力昕 did not utilize their traditional political economy framework to analyze how Taiwan could respond to emerging community communication issues and the offensive of Eastern imperialistic cultural united front.

If scholars do not discuss the boundaries of free speech in defensive democracy or explore Taiwan’s self-cultural communication rights and economic self-protection, how can they promote a higher level of free speech保障? Interestingly, within the entire statement and press conference, the critical discourse from the "leftist academia" has essentially become a protective flank for Chinese authoritarian discourse, highlighting not only a reversal of positions but also a collapse of knowledge politics.

The incident involving 亞亞's short videos indicates that this is not an isolated incident but a microcosm of China's cultural infiltration via digital platforms. Such internet celebrities often portray themselves as "Chinese wives living in Taiwan," attempting to create an image of being harmless and friendly. In these short videos, phrases like "Taiwan will eventually return to the motherland," "Mainland people are all very kind," and "It is the DPP that prevents peace across the strait" are frequently embedded. This kind of cultural united front operation is highly subtle, as it does not forcibly indoctrinate but insidiously conveys political messages through entertainment via "habituation effects."

Further analysis reveals that these short videos are not only expressions but also constitute "micro-narrative warfare units" formed by visual symbols, music, rhythm, and emotional appeals, aimed at gradually diluting the collective identity of Taiwan's subjectivity and manipulating social recognition and fear. This aligns with the global implementation of China's short video united front model, where ideology is repackaged as an emotional experience.

Through the manipulation of everyday language and cross-cultural humor, united front information no longer appears with national slogans but rather packaged within daily life narratives. For example, "going home for dinner" can symbolize family warmth or represent a call to "the embrace of the motherland." These narrative strategies have already formed mature political packaging techniques on platforms like TikTok, Bilibili, and YouTube Shorts.

In summary, platforms like TikTok and YouTube Shorts are battlefields intertwined with algorithms and attention capital, not only limited to content posting but also defining visible content and shaping viewers' sense of reality. China views this as a medium for cognitive warfare and united front strategies, with 亞亞 being a key opinion leader among them. The more profound issue lies in how these platforms' dissemination mechanisms and algorithmic preferences allow Chinese KOLs to leverage algorithmic language, topic selection, and rhythm control to enhance the diffusion and viral potential of their short videos.

Although Taiwanese society is wary of united front content, the exposure of such content amidst the information deluge may still lead to emotional numbness and long-term penetration. When we observe that 馮建三 has chosen to shift focus to other issues, the public discourse direction of critical academia has become voiceless. This prompts us to reflect on how Professor 馮建三, once seen as a symbol of Taiwan's critical communication scholarship, fails to continue discussing the contradictions between his past theories and today’s mainstream social media, instead turning to topics like US-China geopolitics, without delving into the digital competition and ideological monopolies of global platform hegemony. This has resulted in the silence of his critical communication academic circle in the face of reality.

The 亞亞 incident reminds us that when united front strategies no longer rely on traditional media but develop within the algorithmic narratives of short video platforms, our original critical communication theoretical tools seem inadequate. In today's communication ecology, the claim for media publicization appears to have lost its significance, especially in light of the increasingly severe penetration of community hegemony and authoritarianism.

With the dominant status of short video communities, the past expectations for media publicization seem no longer applicable. The thoughts on public broadcasting systems that 馮建三 has promoted for years may have had profound significance in an era dominated by print media and television, yet in today’s algorithm-driven and platform-controlled structure, it is imperative to rethink how to engage with this new environment. The ideal of media publicization construction still needs to align with current digital and political realities to maintain its relevance.

In conclusion, we need a reconstruction of communication political economy to reveal the operations behind algorithms, analyze the suppression mechanisms in society, and further establish sound democratic defense mechanisms. This transformation is not only a dialogue among scholars but also echoes the necessity for democratic defense, rejecting silence in the face of new challenges.