讀後心得

A Chinese national spouse, "亞亞," was determined by the Ministry of the Interior to pose a threat to national security due to her short video on TikTok promoting unification with China, leading to the revocation of her residence permit and a deadline for her departure from the country. This incident has sparked discussions on freedom of speech and the defense of democracy, and has revealed that some scholars have failed to explore how Taiwan can respond to China's penetration of social media from a structural crisis perspective. These short videos have become tools for China to conduct emotional manipulation and cultural unification, delivering political messages through entertainment content and influencing Taiwan's collective identity. Experts are calling for a rethinking of how to effectively respond to the hegemony of modern social media and algorithm manipulation in order to establish cultural discourses that resist totalitarianism, rather than remaining stuck in traditional discussions of media publicization.

Lin Jing-tang recently reported that his Chinese national spouse "Ya-ya" was found to have posted multiple short videos on TikTok promoting unification with China, which led to a report and subsequent determination by the Ministry of the Interior that her actions were a threat to national security, resulting in the revocation of her residence permit and a deadline for her departure. This incident not only raises the boundaries of free speech and the defense of democracy but also reveals the self-defeating position of some "Chinese leftists" while uncovering another layer of structural difficulties.

As short videos have become the frontline for China's narrative infiltration and cognitive warfare, how should Taiwan's critical political economy of communication adjust its discourse and engage in the global struggle against social media hegemony, algorithmic control, and cognitive warfare through short videos in this new order? From the statement made by 75 "scholars," including Professor Feng Jian-san, it can be seen that their criticism of the Lai Qing-te government for compressing free speech lacks policy suggestions for the boundaries of defensive democracy and avoids discussing the United Front model of Ya-ya’s statements.

Regarding this event, we are surprised that communication scholars like Feng Jian-san and Guo Li-xin failed to use their usual political economy thinking to analyze how Taiwan should respond to the new forms of social communication issues. In the context of the popularity of short video culture, how to resist the cultural united front offensive of Eastern imperialism has become a topic worth pondering.

The incident involving Ya-ya's short videos is not an isolated event; these ordinary internet celebrities' short videos are emblematic of China's cultural infiltration through digital platforms. These internet celebrities portray themselves as “Chinese wives living in Taiwan,” gradually implanting phrases like "Taiwan will eventually return to the motherland" through friendly yet culturally contrasting character settings. This kind of cultural united front operation is not about forced indoctrination but rather a subtle influence that allows the audience to absorb political messages while being entertained, even developing an emotional identification with Chinese entertainment culture.

Ya-ya's short videos are not merely expressions; they are "micro-narrative warfare units" constructed through visual symbols, music, rhythm, and emotional invitations, aimed at diluting the collective identity of Taiwan’s subjectivity and manipulating identity and fear. This represents the united front model of short videos that China is gradually promoting globally, making ideology an emotional experience.

Platforms like TikTok, YouTube, and Shorts are battlegrounds intertwined with algorithms and attention capital. These tools are not only crucial for content delivery but also define what content is visible, shaping perceived reality. China uses them as vehicles for cognitive warfare; Ya-ya is just one of many KOLs (Key Opinion Leaders). The deeper issue lies in the platform's broadcasting mechanisms and algorithmic preferences; Chinese KOLs often master title design, topic selection, etc., within the algorithms, giving their short videos high dissemination and viral potential.

If Feng Jian-san chooses to pivot, the public discourse direction of the critical school would become voiceless. Even though Taiwanese society is aware of united front content, the repeated exposure to such content amid the information flood and emotional numbness leads to long-term infiltration. Feng Jian-san's thought on the publicization of media focuses on national cultural responsibility but fails to recognize that capital-driven digital platforms have monopolized the discourse power in the online world, causing his vision to gradually detach from reality.

The Ya-ya incident reveals the political power structure behind media language. As united front efforts no longer rely on traditional media but instead parasitize the narrative of short video platforms' algorithms, existing critical tools appear quite inadequate. In terms of algorithmic governance and data-driven public opinion manipulation mechanisms, the political economy of communication must propose a structural analysis framework.

In facing the challenges of united front tactics and authoritarianism, the political economy of communication needs to update its methods, positions, and adversaries. Refusing to silence ourselves is the deepest tribute to the past. We need to develop a discourse of cultural resistance that can withstand authoritarianism and envision a future, truly reclaiming the power of speech.