讀後心得

Recently, a Chinese spouse named "亞亞" had her residence permit revoked by the Ministry of the Interior due to posting pro-unification videos on TikTok, and she was ordered to leave the country. This incident has sparked discussions on freedom of speech and the defense of democracy. Some scholars criticized the government's actions as an infringement on free speech, but did not offer specific recommendations for defensive democracy, instead steering clear of discussing China's cognitive warfare tactics. This indicates that the field of communication is inadequately responding to the strategic challenges posed by new types of social media, especially as China uses short videos for cultural infiltration, influencing Taiwan's ideology. The unification strategy behind these short videos subtly erodes Taiwan's national identity through entertaining content. In the face of an algorithm-driven modern communication landscape, communication scholars need to reevaluate the concept of media publicization and seek innovative critical approaches to resist digital authoritarianism and cultural unification. This is not only an academic update but also a necessity for the defense of democracy.

Recently, the Chinese spouse "亞亞" was reported for posting several short videos promoting the idea of military unification on the TikTok platform. The Ministry of the Interior determined that her actions endangered national security, leading to the revocation of her residence permit and a requirement for her to exit the country within a specified period. This incident raises the boundaries of free speech and democratic defense, causing some "progressive and left-leaning" individuals to become confused about their own stance, and it highlights a structural dilemma. As short videos become the front line for China's narrative infiltration and cognitive warfare, how should Taiwan's critical communication political economy adjust its discourse to align with the new order of global opposition to community hegemony, algorithmic control, and cognitive warfare via short videos?

Looking back at the statements from Professor 馮建三 and other scholars, they criticize the Lai Ching-te administration for constricting free speech, but fail to provide recommendations on how defensive democracy should delineate the boundaries of free speech. At the same time, they avoid discussing the united front strategies behind the statements made by Chinese spouse 亞亞 and the cognitive warfare structures involved. Surprisingly, communication scholars like 馮建三 and 郭力昕 appear unable to apply their political economy perspective to explore how Taiwan should address the new issues of community communication, especially in the face of cultural unification attacks from Eastern imperialism within short video culture.

If scholars do not address the boundaries of free speech in defensive democracy and do not pay attention to Taiwan's self-cultural communication rights and economic structures for self-protection, how can they discuss higher-level protections of free speech? This has led to the entirety of their statement and press conference, which should have been a critique from the "left academic circle," instead becoming a defensive wing for China's totalitarian discourse. This not only reflects a confusion of stance but also indicates a collapse of knowledge politics.

From the 亞亞 short video incident, the reality of Taiwan's social media battlefield becomes increasingly clear. 亞亞's short videos are not isolated events; what appears to be typical influencer content is actually a microcosm of China's cultural infiltration through digital platforms. This type of influencer presents herself as a "Chinese wife living in Taiwan," crafting a harmless and friendly image, while subtly inserting statements like "Taiwan will eventually return to the motherland," "People from the mainland are very kind," and "It is the DPP that prevents cross-strait peace" within a mere 30 seconds of video. This form of cultural unification is not through forceful indoctrination but through subtle influence, allowing audiences to gradually absorb political messages amidst entertainment, and even foster emotional identification with Chinese entertainment culture.

A deeper analysis reveals that 亞亞's short videos are not merely expressions of speech, but constitute "micro-narrative operational units" made up of visual symbols, music, rhythm, and emotions, aimed at gradually undermining the collective identity of Taiwan's subjectivity while manipulating individual identity and fear. This is precisely the global short video unification model being advanced by China, which reduces ideology to emotional experience. Through the manipulation of everyday language, trivialities of life, and cross-cultural humor, unification information is no longer presented with nationalist slogans, but instead incorporates elements of daily life, such as "going home for dinner," which can symbolize the warmth of home or imply a longing for "the embrace of the motherland." This narrative strategy has developed into a mature political packaging technique across platforms like TikTok, Bilibili, and YouTube Shorts.

Returning to platforms like TikTok and YouTube Shorts, they represent battlegrounds where algorithms and attention capital intertwine. These tools are not only critical for content hosting but also play a role in determining which content becomes visible, thereby shaping the cognitive realities of audiences. China uses these platforms as vehicles for its cognitive warfare and unification strategies, and 亞亞 is merely one KOL among many. The deeper issue lies in the push mechanisms of the platforms and algorithmic preferences. Chinese KOLs often master the language of algorithms, including title design, topic selection, and rhythm control for the opening three seconds, granting their short videos a high potential for viral dissemination.

For a long time, despite Taiwan's society being wary of unification content, the repetitive exposure and emotional desensitization to such content amidst a constant flood of information makes it challenging to escape long-term infiltration. When 馮建三 chose to shift towards critical public discourse, he lost his voice. However, the crux of the issue is not merely the phenomenon of leftist unification discourse being co-opted by China. Once viewed as a leading figure of Taiwan's critical communication school, Professor 馮建三 formerly advocated for profound critiques of media monopolies and capitalist domination; however, now, as social media becomes the mainstream ideological battleground, he tends to discuss geopolitical relations between the U.S. and China rather than engaging deeply with how Taiwan can confront its national responsibilities in this new cultural warfare.

This has resulted in silence from the critical communication academic circle he once led regarding the political economy criticisms of community platforms like TikTok and Facebook. This amplification of support for 亞亞's free speech comes at the cost of ignoring the mechanisms of China's unification discourse, revealing an "ethical blind spot of institutional turn." This does not imply that the communication academic community completely refrains from discussing the political economy of communities, but rather that these discussions have not ascended to the "philosophical high ground of media movements." Compared to the long-held public broadcasting policies advocated by past media reform leaders, there seems to be a lack of philosophical depth in their considerations.

Thus, following the issue of media publicization, the critical school has long lacked a common direction and consensus in communication discourse, especially in countering community hegemony and totalitarian infiltration. As short video communities become mainstream, discussions on media publicization seem increasingly outdated. 馮建三 has long advocated that Taiwan should emulate the BBC's public broadcasting system, emphasizing that media should detach from market logic and political and business monopolies as fields of democratic oversight and cultural representation. Today, as the broadcasting ecology evolves towards an algorithm-centric and platform-based development, the significance of communication academia varies with the times.

Today's communication ecology centers on algorithms, forming a decentralized but highly centralized digital narrative system, no longer governed by national broadcasting policies or public service obligations, but focused on attention allocation and data profit as its core logic. Even if traditional media's broadcasting systems are optimized, effectively penetrating these new discourse battlefields remains difficult. The fundamental reason for the gradual ineffectiveness of media publicization discourse lies in the fact that even if public broadcasting has budgets and content production capabilities, a failure to understand how algorithms reproduce images results in an inability to form effective visibility for their works.

When platforms prioritize click rates and interaction volumes, the pressure to produce public broadcasting content becomes unprecedented, yet there remains the possibility of being "silenced" within the platform ecosystem. This is the violent marginalization of algorithms, a domain untouched by traditional tools. Ultimately, media publicization continues to presuppose that "state governance" can serve as the foundation for media justice; however, in the current era, the state itself is also subject to the sovereignty of platforms and transnational capital, necessitating an adjustment of policy governance logic with the times. The focus of 馮建三's ideas on media publicization lies in the importance of national cultural responsibility, yet he seems to overlook that current capitalist digital platforms have monopolized the circulation rights of online discourse, leading to a disconnect between his ideas on public broadcasting and reality, highlighting the urgent need to seek new paths.

Refusing to be silent: the Taiwanese communication political economy school must enter the post-馮建三 era. The communication political economy represented by 馮建三 has made indelible contributions to exposing media capital domination and promoting media reform movements throughout history. However, under the structural changes with social platforms and short videos becoming the mainstream discourse channel, if the reform focus remains on public broadcasting systems and cultural policy governance, it is clearly out of touch with media realities and deviates from the responsibilities of a new generation of critical theories.

The incident involving 亞亞 has made it clear that when unification strategies no longer rely on mainstream media but instead reside within the algorithmic narratives of short video platforms, the original tools of critical communication theory appear insufficient. In the face of algorithmic governance, data-driven public opinion manipulation mechanisms, and a new political operating model where emotional discourse replaces factual reporting, Taiwan's communication political economy in the post-馮建三 era must shift towards critical analyses that combine politics and community hegemony, proposing structural-level analytical frameworks.

We need a communication political economy that can deconstruct how algorithms prioritize the promotion of specific unification narratives, suppress marginalized political voices, and fabricate false consensus. This new critical theory should dissect the underlying operations of political economy hegemony and knowledge of data sovereignty, thereby intervening in national policy. This is not merely a proposition for academic transformation, but also a theoretical test for democratic defense. The departure of 馮建三's ideas should not be the final chapter of communication political economy but rather a catalyst for reconstruction, stepping into the dangerous terrain of platform hegemony, shedding nostalgic notions of media publicization, and shifting towards a new discourse that critiques digital totalitarianism and algorithmic manipulation.

If communication political economy is to persist, it must not only update its themes but also refresh its methods, positions, and adversaries. Rejecting silence is essential to paying deep homage to the past. What we desire is not merely free speech but to reclaim the power of speech. If the people can realize the unification thinking behind 亞亞's short videos, then her videos will no longer be frightening; what is truly frightening is when they penetrate people's minds while the academic world chooses to remain silent. When 馮建三 abandoned his critique of structural power and chose to align with China's narrative, we lost a set of tools for intervening in reality. This is not a neutral choice by a scholar but an act of relinquishing one's political sovereignty.

If we continue to believe in the value of critical theory, the next step should not be about conservatism but about innovation: we need a set of critical communication theories that can engage with algorithms, expose narrative manipulation, and establish mechanisms for democratic defense. From 馮建三's shift, we witness the loss of voice from an entire generation of academia. And from the infiltration of 亞亞, we understand that language, if not rebuilt, will inevitably be seized by the enemy. At this moment, we seek not merely free speech but a narrative of cultural resistance that is truly belonging to Taiwan and capable of resisting totalitarianism and envisioning the future.