讀後心得

The Chinese spouse "亞亞" has been identified by Taiwan's Ministry of the Interior as a national security threat for promoting unification with armed force on TikTok, leading to restrictions on her departure from the country. This incident has sparked discussions about freedom of speech and defensive democracy, while also reflecting some scholars' disregard for China's united front tactics. 亞亞's short videos, which appear to be harmless lifestyle shares, actually embed political messages through subtle influence, aiming to dilute Taiwan's collective identity. Communication scholars like 馮建三 have criticized media capital monopolies, but in the context of the new media environment, there is a lack of effective countermeasures against the manipulation of social media. As social platforms become a new ideological battleground, communication theory needs to be redeveloped to address digital totalitarianism and algorithmic manipulation, in order to form more effective cultural resistance mechanisms.

Recently, the Chinese spouse "亞亞" was reported for posting multiple short videos promoting unification on the TikTok platform. The Ministry of the Interior subsequently determined that her actions posed a threat to national security and decided to revoke her residency permit and order her to leave the country within a specified time. This incident not only touches the boundaries of freedom of speech and democratic defense but also exposes the imbalance in the stance of some "pro-China leftists," revealing the structural dilemma of short videos as a frontline for China’s narrative infiltration and cognitive warfare. How should Taiwan correct its self-narrative in the political economy of critical communication to respond to global anti-community hegemony, algorithmic control, and cognitive warfare in short videos?

It is worth noting that Professor 馮建三 and 75 other scholars issued a statement criticizing the Lai Ching-te government for restricting freedom of speech, yet provided no concrete policy suggestions on how to delineate freedom of speech boundaries in defensive democracy, while also neglecting the unification model of "亞亞's" statements and the cognitive warfare structure behind it. As communication scholars, the responses from 馮建三 and others like 郭力昕 did not explore Taiwan's strategic response to new cases with their usual political economy thinking, especially concerning the theme of cultural infiltration by Eastern imperialism under short video culture.

If scholars do not involve themselves in the boundary of freedom of speech in defensive democracy or discuss the protection of Taiwan’s self-cultural communication rights and communication economic structures, how can we build a higher level of freedom of speech? Conversely, the entire statement and criticisms in the press conference have become a protective wing for Chinese totalitarian discourse, which is not only a confusion of stance but also a collapse of knowledge politics.

The incident involving 亞亞's short videos is not an isolated case; such influencers use the role of "Chinese wives living in Taiwan" to implicitly execute cultural unification. Through short 30-second videos, she often leads viewers to accept underlying messages such as "Taiwan will ultimately return to the motherland," with the core of this cultural unification operation being the subtle instillation of resonance, akin to the "inculcation effect" in communication theory, allowing the audience to gradually absorb political messages while being entertained, even developing an emotional resonance with Chinese entertainment culture.

From an analytical perspective, 亞亞's short videos are not merely expressions of speech but rather a "micro-narrative warfare unit" composed of visual symbols, music, rhythm, and emotion, aimed at diluting the collective identity of Taiwan's subjectivity and manipulating identification and fear. This is precisely the short video unification model promoted by China globally, reducing ideology to emotional experience.

The narrative strategy of short videos has established mature political packaging techniques on platforms like TikTok, Bilibili, and YouTube Shorts. These platforms have become competitive arenas interweaving algorithms and attention capital, affecting content visibility and defining what content can be seen. Through these platforms, China conducts cognitive warfare, with 亞亞 being just one among many KOLs.

A deeper issue lies in the push mechanisms of platforms and the preferences of algorithms. Chinese KOLs usually capitalize on the linguistic advantages of algorithms, giving their short videos higher communication potential. Even if Taiwanese society is aware of unification content, it can be difficult to resist the influence of repeated exposure in the information flow, which may ultimately lead to long-term infiltration.

When 馮建三 chose to shift towards critical school public discourse, his former stance became paralyzed. Although regarded as a leader of the critical communication school, Professor 馮 previously advocated for media publicization and criticism of news monopolies—ideas that were critical during the era of traditional media. However, in today's ideologically charged battlefield dominated by social media, Professor 馮 shifted his focus to US-China geopolitics, no longer deeply exploring how to address the state responsibilities and cultural governance necessary for a new cultural war.

What needs urgent discussion is the discourse on media publicization, which has now proven ineffective in today's algorithm-driven environment. As national governance is also influenced by transnational capital and digital platforms, the application of communication political economy must adjust accordingly to the times. While 馮建三 focuses on the cultural responsibilities of the state, he overlooks the impact of capital monopolies on online discourse, ultimately leading to a disconnection between his public broadcasting philosophy and reality, necessitating new strategies to address the challenges posed by platform hegemony.

Refusing to remain silent: Taiwan's communication political economy must advance into the post-馮建三 era. The contributions made by the school represented by 馮建三 in exposing media capital's domination are indelible. However, if we continue to center the reform focus solely on public broadcasting systems and cultural policy governance in the mainstream discourse of social platforms and short videos, it clearly cannot keep pace with the current media realities and diverges from the new generation of critical theory.

The 亞亞 incident reveals that unification warfare no longer relies on mainstream media but rather parasitizes the algorithmic narratives of short video platforms, suggesting that the existing tools of critical communication theory may no longer be applicable. In the face of algorithmic governance and emotional manipulation modes, post-馮建三's communication political economy must refocus on the integration of criticisms of community hegemony and construct a structural analytical framework. This new critical theory should thoroughly investigate how algorithms promote specific unification rhetoric, suppress marginalized voices, and manufacture fictitious consensus, intervening in actual policies through reflections on political economic hegemony.

Ultimately, what we pursue is not only freedom of speech but also the establishment of a cultural resistance discourse that truly belongs to Taiwan, capable of resisting totalitarianism.