讀後心得

Recently, the Chinese national spouse, 亚亚, posted a short video on TikTok supporting reunification with China, which was deemed a threat to national security by the Ministry of the Interior, leading to the cancellation of her residence permit and a deadline for her to leave the country. This has sparked a discussion about freedom of speech and the defense of democracy. Experts have criticized the Lai Ching-te government for suppressing freedom of speech, but have not provided suggestions on the boundaries of defensive democracy. 亚亚's short video is not just an isolated case; it is a reflection of the infiltration of Chinese culture, conveying unification messages through endearing character settings. This subtle operation makes the audience gradually accept Chinese culture while being entertained. Scholars have failed to propose effective strategies in response to the new challenges posed by social media, resulting in stagnation in the discussions of political economy, necessitating a realignment to face the challenges of platform hegemony and algorithms, and to rebuild Taiwan's cultural resistance discourse.

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Recently, a Chinese spouse "亞亞" was reported for posting multiple short videos promoting military unification on the TikTok platform, which the Ministry of the Interior deemed a threat to national security. Consequently, her residence permit was revoked, and she was ordered to leave the country. This incident not only challenges the boundaries of free speech and democratic defense but also prompts some left-leaning individuals to engage in self-reflection, revealing deeper structural dilemmas. As short videos have become the front lines for China's narrative infiltration and cognitive operations, how should Taiwan's critical communication political economy adjust its discourse to participate in resisting the new communication order characterized by global anti-community hegemony, algorithmic control, and cognitive warfare through short videos?

From the statement issued by Professor Feng Jian-san and 75 scholars, it is evident that they criticize the Lai Ching-te government for restricting free speech without providing specific policy recommendations on the boundaries of free speech in defensive democracy. They also avoid reflecting on the United Front model behind 亞亞's remarks and the structure of cognitive warfare. Surprisingly, scholars like Feng Jian-san and Guo Li-hsin have not analyzed how Taiwan should face the issue of new community communication through their usual political economy perspective, nor have they addressed the cultural unification offensive under short video culture driven by Eastern imperialism.

If scholars are unwilling to discuss the boundaries of free speech in defensive democracy and cannot delve into self-protection of Taiwan's self-cultural communication rights and communication economic structure, how can they further protect free speech? Conversely, the entire statement and these so-called "leftist academic" critiques in the press conference are seen as supporters of Chinese totalitarian discourse, which not only showcases confusion of positions but also indicates a collapse of knowledge politics.

The 亞亞 short video incident is not an isolated event; the seemingly everyday short videos from influencers represent a microcosm of China’s cultural infiltration on digital platforms. These influencers claim to be "Chinese wives living in Taiwan," crafting an image that is harmless, friendly, and amusing in terms of cultural differences, embedding phrases like "Taiwan will eventually return to the motherland," "Mainland people are very kind," and "It’s the DPP that prevents peace across the strait" within just 30 seconds.

This kind of cultural unification operation does not manifest in a coercive manner; instead, it operates subtly through the "inculturation effect" in communication theory, allowing viewers to gradually accept political messages while being entertained, even developing emotional identification with Chinese entertainment culture. Upon deeper analysis, 亞亞's short videos are not merely speech; they constitute a "micro-narrative warfare unit" composed of visual symbols, music, rhythm, and emotion, aimed at gradually diluting the collective identity of Taiwan's subjectivity, manipulating identification and fear.

This is precisely the short video unification model that China is gradually promoting globally, transforming the form of ideological dissemination into emotional experiences. Through everyday language, trivial daily matters, and cross-cultural humor, unification messages are no longer directly conveyed through nationalistic slogans, but are instead concealed behind the masks of daily life. For example, "going home for dinner" can symbolize familial warmth but also suggests "the embrace of the motherland." Such narrative strategies have already formed a set of mature political packaging techniques on platforms like TikTok, Bilibili, and YouTube Shorts.

Looking back, platforms like TikTok and YouTube Shorts can be seen as battlegrounds where algorithms and attention capital intertwine. These platforms are not only critical for content distribution but also define what content is visible, thereby shaping our perceptual reality. China utilizes these platforms as tools for cognitive operations and unification strategies, with 亞亞 being just one among many KOLs. The deeper issue lies in the platform's promotion mechanism and algorithmic preferences. Chinese KOLs can effectively navigate the language of algorithms concerning title design, topic selection, and opening rhythm, endowing their short videos with high potential for dissemination and viral spread.

For a long time, even though Taiwan's society is aware of unification content, this content continues to be repeatedly exposed amid the flood of information, leading to emotional numbness and ultimately resulting in long-term infiltration. When Feng Jian-san chooses to turn away, the public discourse of the critical school also becomes voiceless. The root of the problem lies in how leftist unification discourse has been completely hijacked by China. Once regarded as a representative figure of Taiwan's critical communication school, Professor Feng advocated for media publicization and reforms of public broadcasting systems, offering deep critiques of news monopolization and capital domination. In the era dominated by old media, these ideas were of significant importance.

However, in the face of social media becoming the mainstream battleground for ideology, Professor Feng has shifted focus to U.S.-China geopolitics, unilaterally calling for Taiwan to engage in "equidistant diplomacy," without further exploring how to navigate the national responsibility of responding to new forms of cultural warfare and "cultural governance." At the same time, he fails to pay attention to the digital struggle for global platform hegemony and ideological monopoly dominated by transnational capital, data algorithms, and emotional mechanisms.

In the case of 亞亞, the critical communication academic circle that he once led appears to remain collectively silent on the political economy critique of social platforms such as TikTok and Facebook, making the support for 亞亞's freedom of speech seem particularly unusual while turning a blind eye to the mechanism of Chinese unification discourse control, highlighting the "ethical blind spot of institutional turn."

This does not mean that the communication academic community lacks discussions on communication political economy; rather, these discussions have not risen to the "philosophical height of media movements," as advocated by past media reform societies regarding public policy directions. In other words, since the issue of media publicization emerged, the critical school has been long lacking consensus in communicating discourse, especially when facing the encroachment of community hegemony and totalitarianism.

In an era dominated by short video communities, discourse on media publicization has appeared outdated. Professor Feng has long argued that Taiwan should imitate a BBC-style public broadcasting system, emphasizing that media should serve as a field for democratic oversight and cultural representation, breaking away from market logic and political-business monopolies. Such institutional imagination holds importance in resisting media capital control, especially in times when print and television still dominate public information circulation.

However, today's communication ecology has shifted to an algorithm-centric, platform-based structure. Platforms like TikTok and YouTube Shorts have created a decentralized yet highly concentrated digital narrative system, which is no longer regulated by national broadcasting policies nor bound by public service obligations, but instead revolves around the logic of attention allocation and data profit.

In this structure, no matter how much one optimizes the traditional broadcasting system, it is challenging to effectively enter the new discursive battleground. The gradual ineffectiveness of the media publicization discourse stems from the fact that even if public broadcasting possesses budget, production, and broadcasting autonomy, one must understand how algorithms represent images to form effective visibility for works within the logic of algorithms. When platforms prioritize click rates and interactions, public broadcasting content production will face greater pressure, and may still be "silenced" within the platform ecology. This represents a form of algorithmic violent marginalization, a challenge that traditional tools of the past cannot address.

Finally, media publicization still assumes that "state governance" can serve as the foundation for media justice. While there is indeed a necessity for national cultural infrastructure, when the state is also influenced by platform sovereignty and transnational capital, this policy governance logic must invariably be adjusted with the changing times. Professor Feng’s ideas on media publicization pay attention to national cultural responsibility, but overlook that capitalist digital platforms have monopolized the discourse circulation rights in the online world, causing his concepts of public broadcasting to gradually disconnect from reality and necessitate seeking alternative paths or adjustments to respond to platform hegemonic political economy.

"Refusing to be silent: Taiwan's communication political economy must move into the post-Feng Jian-san era." The contribution of the communication political economy represented by Feng Jian-san is indelible in revealing media capital monopolization and promoting the media reform movement's history. However, under the structural transformation of mainstream discourse in community platforms and short videos, limiting the reform focus to public broadcasting systems and cultural policies is obviously out of touch with reality and diverges from the responsibilities of a new generation of critical theory.

The 亞亞 incident makes us realize that when unification no longer relies on mainstream media but instead parasitizes the algorithmic narratives of short video platforms, the original critical communication theoretical tools become inadequate. In the face of algorithmic governance, data-driven public opinion manipulation mechanisms, and emotional discourse patterns replacing factual reporting, Taiwan's communication political economy in the post-Feng Jian-san era must shift towards critiquing the intersection of politics and community hegemony, presenting a structural analytical framework.

What is urgently needed is a form of communication political economy that can deconstruct how algorithms prioritize broadcasting unification language, suppress marginal political voices, and manufacture fictitious consensus. This new critical theory should return to exposing the operations behind political economic hegemony and the knowledge of data sovereignty to intervene in national policy. This is not just a topic of academic transformation; it is also a theoretical challenge for democratic defense.

The departure of Feng Jian-san should not mark the end of communication political economy, but rather serve as an opportunity for reconstruction, moving into the risk landscape of platform hegemony, abandoning nostalgic discourses of media publicization, and turning towards new narratives critiquing digital totalitarianism and algorithmic control. If communication political economy wishes to survive and develop, it must update its issues, methods, positions, and targets of resistance, refusing silence in homage to the past's greatest achievements. It is not only about speaking up but also about reclaiming the power to speak.

If people realize the unification thinking behind 亞亞's short videos, then 亞亞's short videos themselves are not terrifying; what is truly frightening is when these messages penetrate the hearts of people, and the academic community chooses silence. When Feng Jian-san lowers his critique of structural power and merges with China's unified thinking, we lose the tools to intervene in reality. This is not a neutral choice of intellectuals, but a loss of sovereignty.

If we still believe in the value of critical theory, the next step should not be conservatism but innovation. We need a set of critical communication theories capable of combating algorithms, exposing narrative control, and establishing mechanisms for democratic defense. From Feng Jian-san's turn, we see the collective silence of the entire discipline, but from 亞亞's infiltration, we realize that if language is not rebuilt, it will inevitably be taken away by opponents. At this moment, what we need is not only freedom of speech but also the construction of a truly Taiwanese narrative capable of resisting totalitarianism and looking towards the future.